In August 2014, the RF Government discussed a number of very important economic issues, including the introduc on of altera ons in Russia's pension system and the adop on of t-for-tat trading sanc ons against the countries that had previously introduced trade restric ons on Russia. The fi nal week of August saw a sharp deteriora on of the situa on in eastern Ukraine, whose territory was actually entered by Russian troops. As a result, the interna onal situa on immediately worsened.
On 5 August, the State Council (an advisory body mainly composed of governors) held its plenary meeting, during which it addressed the issue of introdu cing altera ons in Russia's pension system. Most probably, it was at this mee ng in Voronezh (una ended by most of the ministers) that the decisions to keep the funded component of labor pension frozen for yet another year (2015) and to impose retaliatory sanc ons on a number of OECD countries (publicly declared on 6 August) were taken. The decision that the funded component of labor pension should remain frozen throughout 2015 blatantly contradicted the previous promises of the RF Government 1 . It had an unexpected fallout -Sergei Beliakov, First Deputy Minister of Economic Development, proved his me le by publicly and harshly cri cizing this move, and being immediately sacked in response. The previous government decision that the funded component of labor pension should be frozen throughout 2014 had been 1 Thus, as early as December 2013 Dmitry Medvedev affi rmed that the RF Government had no plans to abolish the funded component of labor pensions, while in July 2014 the heads of the RF Ministry of Finance and the RF Ministry of Economic Development unequivocally promised that the funded component would be restored in 2015. 'explained' by the necessity to insure the contribu ons already paid to non-governmental pension funds and to convert these funds into joint-stock companies in order to prevent their bankruptcies and possible capital losses. Serious misgivings had been voiced, namely that the main inten on of the government was to transfer these savings to the budget for the purpose of spending them, and to prevent a con nua on of the mass exodus of contributors from State Corpora on 'Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Aff airs (Vneshekonombank)' ac ng as the asset manager for molchuny (the silent ones) 2 . Thus, the authori es have considerably complicated the procedure for submitng applica ons (according to the new regula on, such applica ons must be submi ed personally, by the ci zens themselves, while in the past this could be done through a relevant non-governmental pension fund). Moreover, there was a sharp rise in the number of applica ons rejected for minor errors, etc. To make a long story short, the State annually expropriates from non-governmental pension funds approximately Rb 250bn. On the one hand, this is a huge amount of money. On the other hand, this sum is far too small to make any diff erence for the state budget, or even for the pension system itself. But in one respect the alar mists were defi nitely right -the RF Government is clearly planning to con nue the use of this method of income mobiliza on at least for the me being. Furthermore, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets and Minister of Labor and Social Protec on Maxim Topilin have both spoken in favor of completely abolishing the funded component of labor pension. However, neither of them has -so far -advocated a direct confi sca on of the Rb 1 trillion already accumulated in the funded system (although it would have been a logical step along the chosen path). Without going into too much detail about the pluses and minuses of one or other pension system 1 (this issue is a subject relessly discussed at worldwide conferences and congresses, and it should also be added that in some countries, including Russia, the growth rate of savings lags behind the growth rate of infl a on), it is important to emphasize two points. The fi rst one is poli cal in nature: the authori es have been disregarding the clearly stated public opinion shared by the majority of people, who may of course make mistakes but nevertheless will never forget this experience when shaping their own a tude towards the government. And the second point is that the administra ve leapfrog involving the pension system (this is a second large-scale reform literally in one year's me) deprives people of any true incen ves to seek sources of legal earnings -which previously had been considered one of the government's major achievements, because in 2013 the revenue generated by personal income tax and social contribu ons became the biggest budget revenue item, pushing aside revenues from mineral resources (generated by the mineral resource extrac on tax and export du es), which used to top the budget. It is expected that the people's response would be to move into the shadow economy, and not to invest their personal savings in the non-governmental pension system. The fi nal decision will probably be made by the RF Government at the me of preparing the next dra budget in September 2014.
In
By way of responding to sanc ons against Russia, this country for her part imposed a ban on imports of a broad range of foodstuff s from the USA, the EU, Canada, and for some reason also Norway (a country that prior to the introduc on of Russian sanc ons had taken no part in the EU economic sanc ons). The choice of food as a target for retaliatory t-fortat sanc ons is quite logical due to an oversupply of food in the developed world. Besides, agricultural producers are a modestly sized but a very ac ve poli cal lobby -especially in Europe. Another point on the plus side is that, in a situa on when the Russian Federa on's obliga ons to the WTO are, in fact, being devalued, Russia can now replace some types of imported goods by their domes cally produced counterparts, which previously had prac cally no chances of winning in a compe on with well-subsidized European imports -fi rst of all, vegetables and poultry meat. However, some other circumstances should also be remembered: thus, for example, a er pork imports from the EU had been discon nued in March in the framework of the so-called 'sanitary sanc ons' 2 , while Russia does not supply suffi cient quan es of pork on the domes c market, growth of pork prices over six months amounted to nearly 20% -roughly the share taken up by European pork in the Russian market. It is evident that, even if we tomorrow launch an energe c and carefully planned campaign, we could not be able to save the situa on in sectors like beef or ve-getable produc on, where the produc on cycle can last several years, and so it would have been much more logical not to impose sanc ons on Russia's domes c consumers and to be more selec ve when choosing a target for sanc ons. Besides, from the point of view of economics, the impact of sanc ons will be diff erent for each country of the EU. Some will suff er seriously as a result (in terms of percentage, the bite of Russia's counter-sanc ons will be strongest in Lithuania, whose exports to Russia amounted to 20% of total exports, and in this 20%-share 40% was taken up by agricultural products); in other countries, the eff ect will be no ceable (Finland, Poland, Latvia) ; and there will also be countries where this eff ect will be almost zerofor example, Germany's exports to Russia amount to 3.8%, of which agricultural products take up only 0.4%. Besides, these countries vary in the degree of toughness displayed in their a tude towards Russia (two opposite examples being Finland and Poland). It would have been more logical to impose sanc ons on each individual country instead of the en re EU. And fi nally, Russia must be aware and es mate the eff ect of poten al an -Russian sanc ons in the agricultural sector, where the losses could be most substan al due to the Russian Federa on's strong dependence on imported seeds and biotechnologies. In other words, if the EU, for example, imposes a ban on exports of potato seeds 2 An indisputably posi ve fact is the open recogni on of the poli cal factors that mo vated the Russian government with regard to this issue, which put an end to the clownish and ridiculous prac ce of declaring certain products like Borzhomi mineral water (produced in Georgia) harmful for human health and then, once again, to be wholesome, and so on.
to Russia, the result will be a total collapse of this seemingly 'na ve Russian' product. It should be admitted that the erroneousness of such decisions has already been recognized by Russian authori es who discovered that, having banned all imports of Norwegian salmon into Russia, they inadvertently included in this commodity group also smolt (juvenile salmon), which was also imported from Norway. This means that without Norway, Russia will not be able to subs tute imports from Norway -and so, only two weeks later, the ban on smolt imports was li ed. It is sad that, in their a empt to somehow 'level down' the situa on on the consumer market, which did not change signifi cantly over the past month thanks to availability of old product supplies, Russian authori es are speaking of setng some sort of control over market prices instead of searching for a solu on to the old-standing problem of shortage of storage capaci es for storing vegetable products or the issue of retail area defi cit in big ci es 1 which, once solved, could have made possible largescale supplies by big producers capable to deal with networks sales and overcome the problems posed by defi cit and high price of retain area lease.
At the present moment it is diffi cult to predict exactly what the response of the EU countries to Russian sanc ons is going to be. The leaders of some countries (for example, Hungary and Slovakia) have publicly spoken against escala ng the 'war of sanc ons', others (for example, the Bri sh government) believe it to be a correct strategy which, while bringing no immediate benefi ts, will nevertheless provide an effi cient tool for depriving Russia of resources so as prevent her from pulling geopoli cal tricks in the long run. It is evident that if the situa on in Ukraine is not properly se led, more sanc ons against Russia are inevitable, because the few countries opposed to the policy of sanc ons themselves depend on EU subsidies (as shown, for example, by Bulgaria's experiences with regard to the South Stream natural-gas pipeline). The main focus of pressure on Russia may become further restric ons on fi nancial borrowing by Russian state companies and the Russian government, as well as bringing down the volume of interna onal purchases of Russian energy carriers to a level as low as would be physically possible. It can be expected that the Russian authori es will rethink their policy of import restric ons, as this will be a poten ally even more dangerous course of 'self-sancons' in view of the low localiza on level of Russian produc on, and so there cannot be an easy switchover to products from, say, Turkey and Argen na.
Although the Russian budget in itself has not been faced with any serious problems so far, the need to replace the lost European and US sources of borrowed funds has triggered a compe on of lobbyists for public fi nancial resources. August, for example, saw some public discussions as to the necessity to redirect the investment of the Na onal Welfare Fund's resources from the already approved projects of the expansion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway (the feasibility of the fi rst one is arguable, but that of the second one is indisputable due to the current evident shortage of the railway's actual carrying capacity) to other investment projects in the Far East, an ini a ve put forth by the RF Ministry for Development of Russian Far East. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree ordering a purchase, at the expense of the Na onal Welfare Fund, of preference shares in JSC VTB Bank and JSC Rosselkhozbank to the total value of Rb 239.04bn -evidently by way of responding to the fi nancial sanc ons imposed on these two major banks. And Chairman of Rosne Igor Sechin asked for Rb 1.5 trillion -actually half of all the money held by the Na onal Welfare Fund in its coff ers, which caused a (mild) surprise among the members of the RF Government in view of the fact that Rosne already holds Rb 684bn in its accounts. Later on, Igor Sechin explained that this money was necessary for the company's development, but that in principle it would not be a tragedy if the government should allocate somewhat less than the sum he had originally asked for. However, the demonstrated readiness to attract borrowings from Chinese companies for investment in the Vankor Field (which this year will reach its rated capacity, and so no signifi cant investment in its fi xed assets is actually needed any more) is a sign that one month a er the introduc on of sanc ons, state companies began to experience diffi cul es in refi nancing their debt. The most important goal for Russian authori es in the present situa on is to avoid the mistakes made by countries like Venezuela, where all the money was spent on 'promising projects', a er which the government a empted to regulate prices in condions of infl a on and ended up with a collapse of the economic system.
The Ukrainian Army, a er its successful off ensive against the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), during which it had managed to take hold of the larger part of relevant territory and directly approach the ci es of Donetsk and Lugansk, was then faced with some serious setbacks in August: in addi on to the evident defi cit of weapons, it had to deal with the results of the tac cal error of a acking the enemy along a thin strip of territory hugging Ukraine's eastern border with the RF in order to regain control over it, which resulted in several units of the Ukrainian Army being surrounded by enemy troops and suff ering heavy losses in manpower and military equipment. Nevertheless, the strategic posi on of the two 'republics' remained grave and precarious -in fact, their only connec on (in fact, their life line) with the Russian border comprised a handful of roads across a narrow stretch of land. So, in late August, the 'republics' launched a 'counteroff ensive' in the direc on of the Azov Sea, displaying an astonishing abundance of 'boots on the ground' and an impressive array of military hardware. Russia had already been repeatedly accused of providing support to the 'republics' 1 , but in late August ten men from the 98th Guards Airborne Division, offi cially sta oned at the city of Kostroma, were captured, the Commi ees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia discovered the disappearance of soldiers allegedly par cipa ng in military exercises in Rostov Oblast, and fresh graves of military servicemen were found in the city of Pskov. The captured soldiers were declared to have lost their way, and then exchanged for Ukrainian 'prisoners of war'. These events actually coincided with the meeting of Vladimir Pu n and Petro Poroshenko in Minsk, which had been planned with a strong hope for a poli cal breakthrough, but which in fact yielded no results, as only issues of secondary importance like exchange of captured men and supplies of humanitarian aid to the combat zone were discussed. The gas issue had not been se led, either, in spite of the call for a compromise voiced by EU authori es, who have a vital interest in gas supplies. The diploma c standpoints of the two par es remain mutually exclusive: Russia demands a poli cal agreement (without actually specifying what needs to be agreed upon) -not with Russia, but with the two 'republics' as yet unrecognized by Ukraine; Ukraine, for her part, believes that an amnesty for those Ukrainian ci zens who have not commi ed grave crimes will be suffi cient, and insists that Russia is a party to the confl ict. Here we witness an evident 'legi macy gap', as not only the subject of poten al nego a ons, but also the status of their parcipants remains undefi ned. The consulta ons, nevertheless, go on. Against this background, a noteworthy development is the decision of the EU summit that took place on 30 August 2014, where the par cipant countries' leaders a empted to assume the role of a go-between in the confl ict. In fact, the only solu on theore cally acceptable for both sides in the confl ict is the introduc on of a 'viable ceasefi re regime' -that is, freezing it in its current phase. The document also envisages the considera on, within a week's me (although the melines may be moved depending on the actual situa on), of the possibility of slapping addi onal sanc ons against the Russian Federa on, including entering everybody involved in one way or another in the func oning of the self-proclaimed 'people's republics' onto the list persons banned from entering EU countries.
The prospects of the confl ict, where no agreement can be shaped so far, suggest that its further escala on is very probable, with a progress towards direct military ac ons between Russia and Ukraine, when Ukraine will be able to get not only economic, but also military aid from some NATO countries (the NATO's charter requiring a unanimous decision of all its par cipants will probably prevent any moves on the part of the enre bloc). In any event, some hints in this line were voiced in August by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his ar cles and public speeches. This may result in protracted military ac ons with the same consequences for Russia's na onal economy as are being now faced by the weaker na onal economy of Ukraine: economic slump, the bulk of government's funds being spent on military needs, shortage of funding for social security issues or government investment, and forced capital fl ight. From this point of view, it would be much more preferable to freeze the confl ict in its present phase -should no compromise between Russia and Ukraine be achieved.
